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I am deeply honored by the papers in 
this symposium. The authors have all 
devoted an enormous amount of energy 
and care to thinking about many of the 
ideas I have written about over the last 
twenty or so years. I am extremely grate-
ful and humbled by their attention to my 
work. I have also found every paper to 
be deeply illuminating; in some cases, I 
have found myself rethinking my posi-
tions; in other cases, I see areas which 
demand more attention than I have giv-
en up to now; in yet other cases I have 
acquired a deeper appreciation for the 
challenges that my views and arguments 
face. In each case, I learned a great deal 
both from the papers and the discus-
sions about earlier drafts of these papers 
that took place at a conference on Equal-
ity and Citizenship at the University of 
Rijeka on July 1 and 2, 2014.
The following remarks are an at-
tempt to summarize some main parts of 
the arguments I have given while re-
sponding to or taking into account the 
criticisms of the authors in this symposi-
um. I have focused on areas in which the 
authors have expressed disagreement 
with my previous positions and have at-
tempted to respond to them as best I 
can. I don’t think I have responded to 
every good criticism made of my work 
and I am sure I have not done full justice 
to all the criticisms. In a sense, the fol-
lowing remarks should be understood as 
a contribution to an ongoing dialogue 
about the foundations and proper struc-
ture of a democratic regime. I have or-
ganized the papers and my responses in 
three groups: the first concerns my argu-
ments about the foundations of democ-
racy in public equality; the second con-




























cerns my discussion of two distinct ver-
sions of the broadly political liberal ap - 
proach to political philosophy; the third 
concerns my efforts to think about the 
ideals of democracy in the context of the 
modern state and its political division of 
labor.
Democracy as grounded  
in Public Equality
Ivan Cerovac’s careful discussion of 
my position on the nature of the justifi-
cation of democracy is correct in saying 
that I do not think that one should speak 
only of the intrinsic value of procedures. 
Democratic procedures and processes can 
and do have instrumental as well as in-
trinsic value, I think. And I try to make 
it clear how this can be so, though I don’t 
think I have answered all the relevant 
questions on this issue.
The first and most important way in 
which I think instrumental value is es-
sential to democracy is that it is essential 
to the basic justification of the state. I 
argue that the state is morally necessary 
in that it pursues morally urgent tasks 
such as the establishment of justice and 
basic security among persons. It also 
pursues public goods. If the state weren’t 
instrumentally necessary to pursue these 
goods, then the argument for political 
democracy would be short circuited 
right from the start. Democracy, as I see 
it, is a decision making process that pur-
sues these goods that treats persons as 
equals in ways they can see treats them 
as equals. Democracy, as I put it, realizes 
public equality among persons in the 
process of attempting to pursue these 
urgent moral goods.
The idea is that there is substantial 
disagreement among persons on ques-
tions as to what justice requires and how 
to pursue it and persons are highly falli-
ble in their efforts to understand justice 
and the public good. They are highly 
cognitively biased in their understand-
ings of justice and the common good 
because of their limited experience and 
limited capacities of inference. Hence 
the disagreement reflects conflict of in-
terest. The interests in correcting for 
cognitive bias, in being at home in the 
world and in being recognized and af-
firmed as an equal provide the founda-
tion, along with the facts of judgment, 
for the idea that persons rationally desire 
to live in a social world that they can see 
treats them as equals. And since there is 
significant disagreement on the values 
and substance of policy, democracy pro-
vides a basic way in which citizens can 
see that they are treated as equals even 
though policy and law do not always go 
their way and do not always treat them 
as equals as they see it. I argue that from 
a public standpoint there is intrinsic val-
ue to democracy because there is a basis 
of valuing democracy that is independ-
ent of the ends that people pursue in 
democracy. Those ends are controversial 
in significant part, and so cannot pro-
vide a public argument for democracy. 
But democracy can nevertheless be val-
ued intrinsically as the appropriate egal-
itarian response to this disagreement 
and conflict.
Each citizen takes two standpoints 
on the democratic process. They attempt 
to use it to pursue what they take to be 
just and desirable outcomes but they 
also see that the process provides a pub-
lic basis on which to treat each other as 
equals despite their differing goals. This 
conception of the intrinsic procedural 
value of democracy has nothing to do 
with what Rawls calls pure procedural 
justice since everyone has views about 
what the best outcomes of the process 












































on these). And I don’t think it has much 
to do David Estlund’s ideas of fair proce-
duralism or fair deliberative procedural-
ism, which he mistakenly attributes to 
me (Estlund, 1998). In The Rule of the 
Many as well as in The Constitution of 
Equality, I argue very clearly that the 
purpose of the state is to realize justice 
and that the purpose of societal deliber-
ation is to learn from each other and to 
improve our understandings of these 
matters that we are duty bound to pur-
sue. The equality that democracy intro-
duces is a kind of constraint on this 
process that publically realizes equality 
among citizens as they enter these pro-
cesses.
I agree with Ivan Mladenović who, 
in the midst of his excellent account of 
the grounds and consequences of public 
equality, argues that I overstate the sig-
nificance of publicity in my discussion 
(Mladenović, vide supra). He argues that 
one does not need to invoke public 
equality in the justification of institu-
tions as well as interpersonal relations. 
He is right to say that public equality is 
especially important in the context of 
political and legal institutions and need 
not regulate interpersonal relations. The 
basic reason for this is that the publicity 
necessary in the context of a larger soci-
ety is important for the relations among 
strangers who can be expected to know 
little about one another. In the relations 
among friends and family and maybe 
even colleagues, the more impersonal 
norms of public equality need not be as 
stringent. In these relations the mutual 
ignorance of interests and concerns does 
not obtain as strongly and so one can 
live by norms that imply a great deal 
more mutual knowledge. It should be 
said that these norms display a kind of 
publicity but not the kind that is neces-
sary for society as a whole. As Mladeno-
vic notes, friends and colleagues do 
share more refined understandings of 
each other’s interests in terms of which 
they can justify their interactions. This is 
still a kind of publicity though on a 
smaller more local scale.
Mladenovic is also correct to take 
me to task for a certain sloppiness in my 
characterization of democracy as the 
unique realization of public equality in 
collective decision making (Mladenović, 
vide supra). I sometimes speak as if it is 
the unique realization of public equality 
simpliciter. I mean to say that when col-
lectively binding decisions are to be 
made, democracy is the unique realiza-
tion of public equality in the process of 
collective decision making in the context 
of pervasive disagreement and conflict. 
This accords with what he calls the first 
interpretation of my claim. Once we think 
of democracy and public equality in this 
way it is hard to see the merit in Richard 
Arneson’s view that if we had an auto-
cratic regime that brought about just 
outcomes, that would be sufficient to re-
alize public equality (Arneson, 2004, p. 
57). The problem is that the facts of per-
vasive disagreement and cognitive bias, 
which I assume are fully accepted by ra-
tional persons, would imply that the in-
terests of those not included were not 
being taken into account. It would clear-
ly imply that all person’s interests were 
not being given equal consideration and 
that persons were not recognized and 
affirmed as equals. I would have thought 
that the same reply would work against 
Estlund’s plural voting suggestion (Est-
lund, 2009: 245). The trouble is that the 
standards by which we choose who are 
the most competent are going to be par-
tisan and the subjects of pervasive dis-
agreement. Since the standards them-
selves could not be public (given disa-
























that given the facts of disagreement and 
cognitive bias and fundamental interests 
in having one’s judgment accorded re-
spect when these facts obtain, persons 
would have very good reason for think-
ing that they were excluded or given less 
power on the grounds that their interests 
were of lesser significance.
Cerovac notes that an instrumental 
dimension comes in to the picture once 
we accept the Paretian egalitarianism that 
I defend (Cerovac, vide supra). He ar-
gues that my arguments against direct 
de mocracy, lottery democracy and in 
favor of democratic deliberation display 
a dimension of instrumentalism. His 
idea is that I argue against direct democ-
racy and in favor of representative de-
mocracy on the grounds that represent-
ative democracy better pursues well-be-
ing than direct democracy does. The 
argument against lottery voting and in 
favor of democratic voting is also that 
democratic voting better secures well- 
being as does deliberation (Cerovac, 
vide supra). But this isn’t quite the way I 
think of the argument for representative 
and deliberative democracy. The argu-
ment in favor of representative democ-
racy is that it gives members of society a 
greater control over the society by means 
of having a much more effective way of 
making decisions. It is a Paretian egali-
tarian argument in that it argues that 
though direct democracy does seem to 
give greater equality in control over the 
society than does representative democ-
racy, because the process of decision 
making is likely to be so ineffective since 
it makes no use of an intellectual divi-
sion of labor, everyone gains in control 
over the society through representative 
democracy. Of course, a division of la-
bor always threatens to realize a certain 
amount of inequality in power but even 
the power of the least powerful is likely 
to be greater than under direct democra-
cy. So it is not so much well-being that is 
the prime mover in the argument, it is 
political power that is the very purpose 
of democracy to distribute equally. It is 
enhanced by representation. I think a 
similar argument can be run against 
non- deliberative views of democracy. 
Part of the egalitarian condition of de-
mocracy is that it tries to realize an 
equality in the cognitive conditions of 
political decision making. The idea is 
that open deliberation is a way to en-
hance these cognitive conditions through-
 out the society. The Paretian egalitarian 
idea that inequality of some good is 
more just than equality if everyone has 
more of the good in the unequal state 
now applies to the cognitive conditions.
One place where outcomes play a 
central and unqualified role in my ac-
count of democracy is when issues of the 
realization of public equality are at stake. 
I argue that democracy is a realization of 
public equality but I also argue that 
equal liberal rights are public realiza-
tions of equality as is a basic economic 
minimum for all. But this implies, I ar-
gue, that there is an internal limit to the 
authority of democracy in that a demo-
cratic decision that violate these require-
ments of public equality loses its author-
ity. Here the idea is that public equality 
can provide an outcome standard for 
democracy in some cases. Democracy 
can be evaluated in terms of whether it 
protects public equality in the form of 
democracy or in the form of liberal 
rights or economic rights. Here the cen-
tral argument for the intrinsic value of 
democracy comes up against a limit. The 
main argument is that democracy has 
intrinsic value because for many deci-
sions there are no outcome standards 
that are public standards. But this is not 












































economic rights. They are public stand-
ards and so can be used to criticize de-
mocracy from the public standpoint. So 
here we can see that democracy can be 
intrinsically just when it comes to mak-
ing decisions on which there is reas-
onable controversy but it can also be 
straight forwardly instrumentally valua-
ble when it comes to decisions that con-
cern matters at the core of public equali-
ty (Christiano, 2008, chap. 7). I have also 
argued since then that democracy does 
have great instrumental value in protect-
ing certain basic rights of physical integ-
rity (Christiano, 2011).
Democracy and Public Reason
Professor Baccarini’s and Zelić’s pa-
pers pose deep challenges to the ap-
proach to political philosophy that I 
have developed. In my book and some 
other articles I argue against a view of 
deliberative democracy that asserts that 
citizens must argue for law and policy on 
the basis of shared reasons and must ab-
stain from arguing on the basis of rea-
sons that are not shared even if they 
think that they are the correct reasons. I 
call this the narrow conception of delib-
erative democracy. I argue in favor of the 
wide conception of deliberative democ-
racy that citizens may and ought to de-
fend proposals on the basis of what they 
take to be the correct reasons whatever 
these are. My target in this discussion is 
Joshua Cohen’s widely adopted concep-
tion of deliberative democracy (Cohen, 
1993). I argue against this view that it is 
not required by any plausible conception 
of epistemic justification. I argue that it 
is not implied by any plausible concep-
tion of respect for the rational capacities 
of persons. I argue that it cannot avoid 
implying that a very demanding form of 
consensus is required by this approach, 
contrary to the avowed aims of the theo-
rists who defend this view. And finally I 
argue that the view is not required by the 
demand that citizens treat each other as 
equals, indeed it threatens to introduce a 
form of invidious inequality.
The last two arguments go beyond 
criticism of Cohen’s arguments to sug-
gest deep problems in the ideal itself 
(Christiano, 2008, chap 5). The argu-
ment that the view requires an excessive-
ly demanding consensus is motivated by 
the following considerations. The Rawls 
and Cohen requirement of deliberative 
abstinence is grounded on the idea that 
it is more oppressive to persons when 
they live in a society regulated by some 
terms they do not accept than when they 
live in societies that do not conform to 
their ideas of justice (which may be con-
troversial). For example, if I am commit-
ted to the ideas that people should be 
rewarded in accordance with their pre- 
institutionally defined deserts or that 
justice requires a certain kind of com-
munity and these are controversial, then 
by the requirement of deliberative absti-
nence I must be content to live in a soci-
ety that ignores these principles. In other 
words I must be content to live in a soci-
ety in which people do not receive their 
just deserts and I must respect the prop-
erty of those who have more than they 
deserve while ignoring the fact that 
some have less than they deserve. The 
idea behind deliberative abstinence sug-
gests that living in a society that imple-
ments these principles is worse for the 
person who rejects them than is living in 
a society that ignores these principles for 
the person who accepts them. But it is 
simply not clear what justifies this asym-
metry. If there is symmetry between 
these two problems, then either we must 
give up on deliberative abstinence and 
























tions or we must demand a much higher 
level of agreement on principles of jus-
tice than is compatible with the normal 
conditions of free political societies.
Nebojša Zelić questions whether a 
genuine symmetry arises in many cases. 
He invokes the case of stem cell research. 
The dispute arises because some think it 
is wrong to harvest stem cells from eggs 
that have been fertilized and then de-
stroyed on the grounds that the fertilized 
eggs are persons. They think it is wrong 
to kill persons in order to improve the 
life chances of others. Others do not 
think of the fertilized eggs as persons 
and so see the conflict only between life 
and improved life chances of persons 
and so regard the trade off as acceptable 
(Zelić, ms 15). Zelić argues that there is 
no symmetry here because on the one 
side there are generally accepted reasons 
(improvement of life chances) while on 
the other side are reasons that are specif-
ic to a particular comprehensive doc-
trine. The latter impose something that 
they should not impose. But I think that 
this misconstrues the symmetry claim. 
My symmetry claim is that those who 
believe that persons are being murdered 
by this policy but who must nevertheless 
permit it to happen and contribute to 
a state that protects this activity are no 
less oppressed than someone who is re - 
quired to stand by and watch people’s life 
chances be diminished because some 
believe that stem cell harvesting is a kind 
of murder. The one must watch murder 
occur for the sake of a lesser good (be-
cause some don’t think it is murder) 
while the other must stand by and watch 
people suffer because some think it is 
murder to do what is necessary to help 
them. The underlying motivation for the 
restriction to public reasons is the idea 
that it is oppressive to live by principles 
that one does not accept. I claim that this 
oppression can just as easily occur for 
someone who does believe in certain 
principles and watches the society vio-
late them and who indeed must contrib-
ute to the institutions that do this.
Zelić argues against the symmetry in 
two ways as far as I can see. One, he says 
that the opponents of stem cell research 
cannot say that some other “narrow 
moral community won” (Zelić, vide su-
pra) if stem cell research were performed 
while the proponents could say, I assume 
that the narrow religious community 
won if stem cell research was performed. 
Presumably this is because the purpose 
of the stem cell research is one that can 
be accepted on all sides, namely improv-
ing life chances, while the reason for 
stopping it, namely saving a fertilized 
egg because it is a person, is not accepted 
on all sides.
But this just seems to me to conceal 
the symmetry issue. It isn’t at all clear 
that the opponents could not see their 
defeat as a result of a narrow moral com-
munity namely the community that does 
not think that fertilized eggs are persons. 
That is, after all, the original motivation 
for saying that one shouldn’t stop the 
research. But the main point, in any case, 
is that the opponents must experience 
the society, of which they are a part and 
to which they contribute, as murdering 
persons if the research goes ahead, while 
the proponents must experience the so-
ciety as one that does not properly care 
for persons if the research does not go 
through.
Zelić also argues that “It would be 
wrong to deprive people of some good 
or diminish certain political value on the 
basis of the belief that we cannot reason-
ably expect that these persons can ac-
cept” (Zelic, vide supra). Here the pro-
posed asymmetry is that some people 












































when the research is not done but no 
one is losing a generally recognized 
good when the research is done. But this 
is merely an affirmation of the public 
reason principle. The question I ask is, 
why is it wrong or problematic? And the 
answer I see in Rawls and Cohen is that 
it is oppressive to live with others on 
terms one does not accept. Once we put 
it in this way, the question of symmetry 
becomes is it oppressive to live in a soci-
ety that refuses to accept the principles 
of justice one accepts and engages in 
many actions that violate those princi-
ples? Again, I don’t see that there is an 
asymmetry here.
The second argument I give is that it 
is unclear how the deliberative absti-
nence advocated by Cohen is required 
by the idea of treating others as equal 
democratic citizens. I treat my fellow 
citizens as equals when I make sure that 
they have equal votes, resources for bar-
gaining, opportunities to participate in 
deliberation and when I give them a re-
spectful hearing when they present their 
views. The worry with the idea of delib-
erative abstinence is that it implies that 
one need not give another a respectful 
hearing when it challenges the com-
monsense morality of the society (to the 
extent that there is one). This looks like 
it has the potential for recommending 
that some people not be listened to and 
thus has the potential for implying that 
some are treated as less than equals.
Zelić questions whether I have given 
an adequate basis for community in my 
account of democratic deliberation (Zel-
ic, vide supra). My intention with the 
idea of public equality is to give a kind of 
basis for community. Remember that 
public equality is meant to serve as a re-
alization of the recognition and affirma-
tion of each person as an equal, which I 
posit as a fundamental interest. Persons 
are duty bound to treat their fellows as 
equals and to affirm their equality and 
they are duty bound to try to define so-
cial life in a way that advances the inter-
ests of all of their fellows. The egalitarian 
pursuit of the common good is the fun-
damental idea here. But, of course, peo-
ple have very different ways of conceiv-
ing of this more abstract idea and this 
will give rise to wide deliberation. I 
should add that I do not think that the 
account of equality in deliberation is 
merely distributional; my view is that 
one must listen to others in the process 
of deliberation and treat their views with 
respect. This involves a genuine attitudi-
nal component. Two points are worth 
noting here about this. One, the kind of 
community I am proposing is somewhat 
thinner than the Rawlsian one; this is 
because I recognize the legitimacy of a 
much wider array of disagreements. I 
think this is truer to our experience of 
the modern state and society. Two, the 
value of community is grounded in 
deeper values. It is grounded in the val-
ues of human well-being and of equality. 
In this sense, I think of myself as giving a 
kind of relational conception of equality 
with the theory of public equality but 
grounding it in a deeper conception of 
the value of humanity and equality.
Professor Baccarini accepts that my 
arguments may be good ones against the 
version of deliberative democracy that 
Cohen advances. But he proposes in-
stead an alternative view of the Rawlsian 
project that does not fall prey to the 
same problems. The alternative proposal 
is that the Rawlsian project is really con-
cerned to establish the coherence of lib-
eralism and that for this to be established 
one need only assume a highly idealized 
set of citizens who actually do agree on 
all the main ideas of justice and their 
























here is that all citizens reason on the ba-
sis of shared reasons as in the view I have 
criticized but here the idea is that those 
shared reasons are “constitutive” of the 
ideals of freedom and equality and the 
idea of society as a fair system of cooper-
ation (Baccarini, vide supra). In other 
words to argue in terms of any other 
reasons aside from these is to fail to treat 
one’s fellow citizens as free and equal. In 
an ideal society we assume that everyone 
thinks in terms of these reasons because 
they all think in terms of treating each 
other as free and equal (Baccarini, vide 
supra). Thus the problem of asymmetry 
is avoided because we are assuming a 
kind of consensus on all the ideas of jus-
tice. And the problem of democratic 
equality is solved because there is agree-
ment on these ideas and so no one is ig-
nored in the process of deliberation. 
Hence the criticisms I direct at Cohen’s 
project do not apply.
Baccarini suggests that this approach 
has a main advantage over the view I 
have defended. My view advances of 
 picture of democratic society in which 
there is a great deal of disagreement 
about justice. It proposes to resolve the 
disagreement in an egalitarian way by 
giving persons equal political power in 
the process of collective decision mak-
ing, and constraining collective decision 
making by giving persons equal liberal 
rights, an economic minimum and by 
altering the process of collective deci-
sion making in order to avoid, when 
necessary, the problem of persistent mi-
norities. All of these ideas are grounds 
for institutional constraints on collective 
decision making. And when the con-
straints are violated, say when a group’s 
freedom of expression is violated by a 
particular set of laws, those laws lose 
some of their democratic authority. All 
of this is supposed to be tied together by 
the idea, which I defend at length, that 
each of these constraints are realizations 
of public equality, the very same princi-
ple that grounds democracy in the first 
place. Hence, the activity of collective 
decision making is limited by appeal to 
the same principle that undergirds the 
justice of that collective decision mak-
ing. Hence, I argue that there are inter-
nal limits to democratic authority.
In essence Baccarini’s claim that the 
Rawlsian approach he favors is superior 
to mine comes down to the idea that my 
approach is not a particularly efficient 
way of protecting the freedom and equal-
ity of citizens and it is risky. This is be-
cause I do not impose a constraint on 
how citizens are to reason aside from the 
requirement that they reason in good 
faith on the basis of norms of the com-
mon good and justice. People are per-
mitted to say whatever they think is 
right but if they land on an idea that vio-
lates public equality, they will not be able 
to achieve their aims through the demo-
cratic process. Baccarini thinks it is bet-
ter if we envision a society in which 
people are not reasoning in terms of 
norms that violate freedom and equality. 
This provides a much better and cleaner 
guarantee of the liberties and democrat-
ic rights of citizens and of the protection 
of citizens from permanent minority 
status. If all citizens act and participate 
on the basis of the right conception of 
justice and of the right specification of 
that conception, what can go wrong?
It is not obvious to me that nothing 
can go wrong when citizens all act on the 
basis of the right conception of justice, 
properly specified. The familiar expres-
sion, “The road to hell is paved with 
good intentions,” comes to mind here. 
For one thing, they may have the correct 
moral ideas but false empirical beliefs 












































tutions that curtail liberties in ways not 
envisioned. A simple example of this 
might be the case of sexual harassment. 
For a significant period of time it was 
not thought that free-wheeling discus-
sion in the office of sexual activities 
could be intimidating and ultimately 
oppressive to the women. The women 
themselves may not have had a clear idea 
that this had a silencing and oppressive 
effect on them. It took a few decades to 
elaborate the conceptual framework of 
sexual harassment and some empirical 
understanding of its effects. To be sure, 
many of the people engaged in this ac-
tivity were not particularly concerned 
with the freedom and equality of their 
female co-workers but I think we can 
imagine that a society of persons devot-
ed to freedom and equality could fail to 
understand the effects of what we now 
call sexual harassment. Therefore, de-
spite their devotion to the right reasons, 
they may still create an oppressive at-
mosphere for many of the women in the 
society undermining their abilities to act 
as free and equal participants. So there 
can be objective violations of the free-
dom and equality of persons even when 
persons act on the right conceptions of 
justice. The point of my view is that there 
are certain objective limits on what peo-
ple may do to each other whether they 
are acting in good faith or not.
But my main issue with Baccarini’s 
idea is that though this may well be a 
useful theoretical enterprise, it does not 
solve the problem that I think we need to 
solve when we are thinking of a just so-
ciety. The problem is that there is perva-
sive disagreement on what justice is and 
on what the correct specifications of 
freedom and equality are. I take this to a 
problem that defines a main task of po-
litical philosophy. It is not very different 
from the problem Rawls described when 
he said that we need to devise a concep-
tion of justice for a society in which per-
sons have fundamentally different con-
ceptions of the good life. Here the idea is 
that we need to devise a conception of a 
just society in which persons have very 
different conceptions of justice. The spe-
cific question I pose is: how is it possible 
for persons to treat each other as equals 
despite a great diversity of views about 
the good life and about justice? And my 
solution is to give persons equal power 
to participate in collective decision mak-
ing and equal liberal rights to participate 
in the creation of the more localized 
worlds they live in. When there is disa-
greement, let these persons work out 
how they live together on the bases of 
their own judgments against the back-
ground of equal power. The idea both 
determines the conditions under which 
they devise terms on which they live to-
gether and it defines certain limits to 
what they can decide since they must 
respect the underlying principles both in 
public and in private life.
There are two distinct things to be 
said about this process of respecting the 
disagreements. First, I am trying to de-
velop a conception of what is involved in 
respecting others in the context of per-
vasive disagreement. That is the problem 
to be solved and it cannot be solved by 
either of the two Rawlsian ideas on offer 
because they both assume away the fun-
damental condition to be dealt with. But 
there is a second consideration here as 
well. This is the broadly Millian idea that 
the contest of ideas in political society 
can itself be a fruitful and highly desira-
ble process even when the contest is be-
tween really bad ideas and better ideas 
(Mill, 1989, chap. 2). The idea is that this 
contest is a condition of progress in the 
development of our understanding of 
























ests. Again, the underlying assumption 
is that we are very limited in our abilities 
to grasp justice and that we have deep 
interests in being able to develop a better 
understanding of justice. This underly-
ing assumption, which I think is deeply 
correct, is simply assumed away in the 
picture Baccarini proposes. To be sure, 
for all we know, he is right that the Rawl-
sian picture is the final word on justice 
in society. But I doubt this is correct: in-
duction from reflection on the past as-
sertions of certainty and the many sub-
stantive problems of the Rawlsian pic-
ture lead me to think that we can go a 
long way to improve our understanding 
of justice and that this will be in signifi-
cant part enabled by the existence of a 
democratic and liberal society. To be 
sure, there is no guarantee we will arrive 
at a more just society and a better appre-
ciation of justice; society has gone off the 
rails many times before. But I think our 
best hope is that we can make progress 
while treating each other as equals in a 
democratic and liberal society.
Democracy and the Division of Labor 
in Political Societies
Professor Prijic-Samarzija’s essay is 
an excellent account of some of my ef-
forts to find a reconciliation between the 
democratic ideal of free and equal citi-
zenship and the need for an intellectual 
division of labor in the making of collec-
tive decisions. The history of western 
speculation in political philosophy starts 
with Plato’s idea that democracy and the 
division of labor in political decision 
making are incompatible and that this 
works to the detriment of democracy 
since the division of labor is essential to 
political societies. I have made a number 
of efforts to solve this problem. The first 
effort in The Rule of the Many attempted 
to determine what kind of role citizens 
could play in an intellectual division of 
labor in collective decision making. The 
constraints I imposed on this pursuit 
were (1) that the role would be such that 
it would be compatible with citizens be-
ing essentially in the driver’s seat in po-
litical decision making and (2) that the 
role does not assign them a task that 
would be overly demanding and incom-
patible with their work and family and 
other pursuits. My basic answer to this 
question was that if citizens determine 
the aims that a society is to pursue and 
the rest of the division of labor faithfully 
pursues those aims to the best of its abil-
ity, then the citizens are in the driver’s 
seat. Of course the aims have to be rea-
sonably determinate and citizens must 
decide on the trade-off schedules when 
there is conflict. These aims are con-
cerned primarily with the basic values a 
society is to pursue and the constraints 
that a society must respect in the pursuit 
of various goals. The basic idea is that 
there is not the same kind of expertise in 
the case of the choice of aims because 
there is a great deal of disagreement on 
the basic set of values and their ordering. 
The idea of publicly acceptable moral 
expertise is not available in modern so-
cieties. This is not to say that individuals 
cannot recognize persons who may be 
superior in terms of the knowledge rele-
vant to choice of aims, but only that 
there is no public standard. Citizens 
must choose who is most worthy of be-
ing listened to and they must choose this 
against a background of equal political 
power since any officially established 
unequal distribution would imply a pub-
lic favoring of some persons’ interests 
over others.
My thought was that as long as the 
rest of the division of labor faithfully 












































would be chosen in some majoritarian 
way, the society would be democratic. 
Citizens could be in the driver’s seat and 
they could be equals in this position. But 
I eventually turned to the problem of 
how the rest of the division of labor 
would have to be structured so as to re-
alize this role of faithfully pursuing the 
aims of citizens. And here I developed 
the idea of a realistic system in which 
experts’ and elites’ activities would be 
concerned primarily with pursuing the 
aims of the citizens, a system which Pro-
fessor Prijić-Samaržija describes well. It 
is meant to ensure that experts are de-
voted to pursuing the knowledge neces-
sary to advance citizens’ aims and are 
concerned to put it to the proper use. 
Organizations such as political parties 
and interest group associations can be 
designed with an eye to ensuring this, I 
argue, as long as the mechanisms of sol-
idarity, overlapping knowledge, compe-
tition and sanctions are put to work in 
the right institutional configuration. I 
did argue here that citizens have an im-
portant role to play in the generation of 
this expert knowledge. If expert knowl-
edge is genuinely to be focused on ad-
vancing the interests of citizens the de-
velopment of it must in some way be re-
sponsive to the diversity of interests in 
the society (See Christiano, 2012).
But Professor Prijić-Samaržija points 
to a worry in my discussion to which I 
was not sufficiently alert before she 
showed it to me in the original version of 
her paper that she presented to me at the 
Summer School in Rijeka in June 2014. 
She points out that my discussion is ex-
clusively concerned with establishing the 
objective reliability of the social system 
in producing knowledge that is capable 
of advancing citizens’ aims (Prijić-Sa-
maržija, vide supra). There is no intrinsic 
concern for the idea that citizens ought 
to in some way have a kind of rational 
confidence that their aims are being pur-
sued as best they can. This seems to me 
now to be an unattractive picture of a 
democracy. The original picture is one in 
which citizens choose the aims and then 
have no knowledge of whether these 
aims are pursued or not. As long as they 
are pursued, my initial idea was that de-
mocracy is realized. But now Prijić-Sa-
maržija has persuaded me that it is im-
portant that citizens have some kind of 
reasonable basis of confidence that the 
aims are  being pursued and that there 
are some mechanisms that can tell them 
when they are not being adequately pur-
sued. It is not enough that citizens 
choose the aims and the aims are being 
pursued, the citizens must have some 
reasonable confidence that this is so and 
citizens must be able to respond when 
that confidence has been undermined.
Initially I thought this kind of rea-
sonable confidence would be hard to 
come by without imposing excessively 
demanding information requirements 
on citizens since it seemed they would 
have to have some of the knowledge ex-
perts have. That is why I resisted the idea 
that citizens must have reasonable confi-
dence that the society is pursuing their 
aims. But Prijić-Samaržija points out that 
the very mechanisms I spell out that are 
meant objectively to ensure that the sys-
tem is working can also give citizens reas-
onable confidence in the system. They 
can provide reliable low information 
short cuts for citizens to see that the sys-
tem is working to pursue their aims. The 
mechanisms of solidarity, overlapping 
knowledge, competition and sanctions 
can ensure that alarm bells go off when, 
for example, the science a political party 
relies on has become seriously deficient 
by the lights of the relevant intellectual 
























the relevant knowledge to know when 
the ideas no longer live up to the stand-
ards of the community. To be sure citi-
zens are not in a position to evaluate a lot 
of the disagreements that occur among 
experts. But they will have a sense when 
the views are seriously deficient because 
the intellectual community has incen-
tives to bring out the deficiencies. Hence 
citizens can have reasonable confidence 
that the expert opinion their legislators 
rely on is at least not seriously deficient 
to the extent that no alarm bells go off. 
I have developed these ideas in more 
detail in the article “Voter Ignorance Is 
Not Necessarily A Problem” (Christiano, 
2015).1
Finally, I come to the paper by 
Ivanković. I find his discussion mostly 
quite persuasive and it is an especially 
relevant discussion for me because of my 
view that it is essential to think about 
democratic ideals in the context of the 
real institutional possibilities for realiz-
ing egalitarian ideals. My work in The 
Rule of the Many and in the later essay 
Ivanković discusses takes very seriously 
the idea that the ideals of democracy 
must be realizable in an institutional 
way. Furthermore, I think that our con-
ception of democracy can be trans-
formed by an understanding of how to 
realize it in institutional contexts. My 
own work so far has focused on the 
problem of low information rationality 
1 There is a voluminous literature on in-
formation shortcuts and low information 
rationality in politics. Two of the seminal 
contributions are: Popkin, 1994 and Lupia 
and McCubbins, 1998.
in the context of a division of labor and 
how democratic ideals can be made 
sense of in this context. Much empirical 
literature has focused on the necessity of 
shortcuts for citizens in this context 
(Christiano, 2015) and I have tried to 
integrate that into an understanding of 
democratic ideals.
I agree with Ivanković that an appre-
ciation of cognitive bias and framing is 
essential to an understanding of democ-
racy. Indeed, one of the cornerstones of 
my argument for democracy includes a 
conception of fundamental cognitive 
biases and the need to correct them. But 
I also agree that much more needs to be 
said about this. Two points can be noted. 
One, cognitive bias and framing are, as 
Ivanković says, features of everyday cog-
nition that need to be taken account of 
in the making of legislation. I think the 
account of expertise can go some way to 
accommodating this concern. A second 
point is that framing and cognitive bias 
can, when not properly taken account 
of, threaten the heart of democratic de-
cision making. This is particularly true 
when we are dealing with the kind of low 
information rationality that occurs in 
modern democratic societies. The need 
for shortcuts to cut information costs 
can easily be manipulated when citizens 
are not paying close attention. But it 
should be noted here that part of the 
point of large scale democratic delibera-
tion is to find ways to reduce the op-
portunities of manipulation of citizens 
through an adversarial process. But these 
are points that need much greater elabo-
ration and I thank Professor Ivanković 
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